Related works and preliminaries

Related works
Existing literatures have achieved much progress in ABE with respect to fine-grained access control (Goyal et al. 2006; Waters 2011; Bethencourt et al. 2007; Goyal et al. 2008) , user flexible revocation (Hur and Noh 2011; Yu et al. 2011 ) and attribute based signcryption (Wang and Huang 2011) , etc. Meanwhile, ABE has been widely designed for providing data protection in various network systems such as personal health record system (Li and Yu 2013) , body area networks (Hu and Zhang 2013; Tan et al. 2011) , wireless sensor networks (Yu et al. 2011) , cloud computing (Yang et al. 2012) . However, these schemes may not be entirely realistic to be applied to some application scenarios thanks to the heavy computation cost from bilinear pairing operations. Take the proposed scheme in Xhafa et al. (2015) for instance, if the number of attributes involved in encryption is n, then the decryption will take 4n times of pairing operations, which will bring a heavy computation burden on terminal devices. Consequently, to further improve the efficiency and performance of ABE, the number of pairing operations should be reduced, even totally eliminated.
Besides efficiency, key exposure protection is another issue urgently to be solved in ABE. Many existing schemes have guaranteed forward and backward security when attribute revocation happens by introducing a proxy re-encryption server (Hur and Noh 2011; Yu et al. 2010 ). However, these schemes only focus on the key regeneration of the revoked users, but neglect the key updating for non-revoked users. If a nonrevoked user's private key leaks, the confidentiality of the system will be threatened since the leaked private key is still a valid one. In fact, in attribute based cryptosystem, key refreshing is more important since either attribute revocation or private key exposure protection calls for frequent key-updating. Xu and Martin (2012) proposed an ABE scheme with secure key refreshing in, but their scheme has to regenerate the master key and public parameters in the system, this will bring about much more computation overheads when key updating happens. Key-insulation (Dodis et al. 2002 ) is a promising tool to guarantee forward and backward security as well as achieving high efficiency of key updating. In this mechanism, the lifetime of the system is divided into discrete periods. The public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime, while temporary secret keys are updated periodically. Key-insulation mechanism can provide full security when user's private key exposure happens and it has been designed for effective key exposure protection in identity based cryptosystem (Zhu et al. 2014) , certificateless cryptosystem (Chen et al. 2015) , etc. The advantage of key-insulation mechanism can also be combined into attribute based cryptosystem and propose a key-insulated ABE scheme with efficient and secure key updating.
Hardness assumptions (a) Discrete logarithm assumption (DL):
Given X, P ∈ G, it is computational infeasible to calculate the value of a (a ∈ Z * q ) such that X = aP with a non-negligible probability within probabilistic polynomial-time.
(b) Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH):
For a, b ∈ Z * q , given (p, ap, bp) , it is computational infeasible to calculate the value of abp with a non-negligible probability within probabilistic polynomial-time.
Models and assumptions
A real world example of KI-ABE-WP
One typical application of our KI-ABE-WP is the mobile communication system, which can be illustrated in Fig. 1 . It consists of six entitles: AA, key helper, base station, data centre, data sender and receiver. Base station and data centre are hardware architectures which are responsible for mobile communications and file storage. AA generates initial attribute private keys for each user in the system and the private key corresponds with an access structure. Data sender and receiver are the two sides of communication, data sender encrypts the file with a set of attributes, while a receiver can decrypt the ciphertext if the attributes used for encryption match with the access structure he owns. When system evolves into a new time period, users in the system update their private keys to the latest version with the assistance of key helper. Due to the elimination of bilinear pairing operations, the proposed KI-ABE-WP will relieve the terminal devices from heavy computation burden, thus improving the efficiency and performance of the whole system.
Formalized definition of the algorithms in KI-ABE-WP
Our KI-ABE-WP consist of five algorithms: 
Constructions to our KI-ABE-WP
Concrete algorithms of KI-ABE-WP
Setup
Let G to be a cyclic addition group. Denote q and p to be the prime order and generator of G respectively. AA defines a global attribute set {A i } and picks t i ∈ Z * q for each attribute in {A i }. Let T i = t i p to be the public key of A i . Picks k n ∈ Z * q for each time period TP n in the system lifetime. Let K n = k n p. Chooses a secret number y ∈ Z * q and calculates Y = yp. Define two hash functions
The system public parameters are {G, q, p, A i , T i , K n , Y , H 1 , H 2 } and the system master keys are {t i , y, k n }.
Initial private key generation
AA randomly chooses a polynomial q x for each node x in the user's access tree γ. Denote d x to be the degree of q x and thr x to be the threshold value node. Let d x = thr x − 1. For the root node AA sets q root (0) = y. For any other node (except for root node) in the access tree, let q x (0) = q index(x) parent(x) . The initial attribute private key at time period TP 0 for access structure γ can be denoted by TD γ ,TP 0 = {q
Key updating
When time period evolves from TP n to TP n+1 , AA calculates the updated key compo-
and transfers it to user. User calculates TD γ ,TP n+1 = TD γ ,TP n + U γ ,TP n+1 as the temporal private key at time period TP n+1 .
Encrypt
At time period TP n , for a plaintext M,data sender picks a random number s ∈ Z * q and calculates:
Then data sender sends CT = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 } to data receiver.
Decrypt
Upon receiving CT, receiver calculates:
(1)
Correctness proof
If x is a leaf node, the calculation process is as follows:
All the value calculated from DecryptNode(x, TD γ ,TP n , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) will be stored as F z . For any F z ≠ 0,the algorithm calculates F root (the value of root node) using Lagrange interpolation method.
If x is a non-leaf node, z is the child node of x, then the algorithm calculates the value of DecryptNode(x, TD γ ,TP n , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) as follows:
Since the value of DecryptNode(x, TD i,TP n , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) = q x (0) · sp, whether x is a leaf node or non-leaf node, consequently, the value of root node F root and the plaintext M can be calculated by: 
Security proof and performance analysis
In the lemma (6) Otherwise, Simulator randomly chooses a polynomial q x for each node x in the user's access tree γ. Denote d x to be the degree of q x and thr x to be the threshold value node. Let d x = thr x − 1. For any other node (except for root node) in the access tree, let q x (0) = q index(x) parent(x) . Simulator chooses k 0 ∈ Z * q and sets initial private key 
. If the tuple {γ, A i } does not exist in L H 1 , Simulator aborts the challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E 3 .
Otherwise, Simulator randomly chooses k n ∈ Z * q and calculates TP 0 ) ). Simulator sends TD γ ,TP n to Adversary and adds the tuple into L t {A i , γ , TP n , TD γ ,TP n }.
Decrypt query: Simulator maintains a list L D {A i , γ, CT = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 }, M}. When Adversary asks a Decrypt query for {A i , γ, CT = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 }}, Simulator responds as follows:
Simulator aborts the game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E 4 .
Otherwise, Simulator recovers TD γ ,TP n from L t {A i , γ , TP n , TD γ ,TP n } and calculates
Simulator sends the result to Adversary and adds the tuple into
Phase 3 Challenge: Adversary outputs two plaintext M 0 and M 1 with a challenging access structure γ* at the current time period TP n .
Simulator
If not, Simulator aborts the challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E 5 . If γ* exists in the list L p {A i , γ, c, t i , T i } and c = 0, Simulator aborts the challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E 6 .
Simulator runs Temporal private key generation query for γ* and calculates TD γ * ,TP n = (q x (0) + t i + k n · H 1 (T i , TP n )) * . Then, Simulator picks σ ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ Z * q and calculates:
Simulator sends CT σ = {C 1,σ , C 2,σ , C 3,σ , C 4,σ } to Adversary. Adversary outputs M * σ as a guess of M σ . If M * σ = M σ and Adversary wins the game,
Then we will analyse the time complexity of Simulator in breaking CDH assumption in group G.
From the description, assuming the average number of attributes involved is "n", for each request of Public key generation query, Initial Private key generation query, Temporal private key generation query and Decrypt query, Simulator has to run n times of multiplication operation, n times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation, n times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation, 2n times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation respectively.
During the Challenge phase, Simulator has to run (3n + 4) times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation.
(7)
Denote t sm , t a to be the time consumption of scalar multiplication operation and addition operation in group G respectively. From what has been discussed above, the total time complexity of Simulator t′ satisfies:
Next we will discuss the advantage of Simulator in breaking the CDH assumption. During the process of the challenge game, the responses of Initial Private key generation query, Temporal private key generation query and Decrypt query return to Adversary are valid and indistinguishable if E1, E2, E3, E4 do not happen. Furthermore, if Adversary succeeds in distinguishing M σ and E5, E6 do not happen, then Simulator is capable of breaking the CDH assumption.
Next we will calculate the probability of the incidents discussed above. According to the process of queries phase, the probability of E4 and E6 not occurring can be denoted by lemma (9):
The value of Pr E4 ∩ E6 is maximized in lemma (10) when θ =
Since the responses of Public key generation query act as random oracle model, consequently, the probability of E1 and E5 not occurring can be denoted by lemma (11):
Likewisely, the probability of E2 and E3 not occurring can be denoted by lemma (12):
Taking all the probabilities of the above incidents into account, it can be figured out that if Adversary successfully attacks our scheme with an advantage ɛ, then a Simulator can break the CDH assumption in group G with an advantage of ɛ′ which satisfies:
Secure and efficient key updating
Our scheme achieves both secure and efficient key updating. According to the Keyupdating algorithm, the updated key component for attribute A i at time period TP n+1 is calculated as
. Since a user cannot obtain the value of k n+1 , k n , it is computational infeasible for him to calculate the value of U γ ,TP n+1 and update his private keys. Without loss of generality, when a user's private key TD γ ,TP n was leaked during the time period TP n , the system still maintains safe after TP n since all the private keys have been securely updated.
With respect to the computation cost, key updating for a single attribute at a discrete period only needs one multiplication operation, one addition operation and 1 H 1
operation. Besides, the system parameters remain unchanged throughout different time periods and this will reduce more the communication overheads.
Performance analysis
In this paper, assuming that the number of attributes involved in encryption is n, according to the algorithms discussed above, the Encrypt algorithm will take (n + 3) times of multiplication operations, one addition operation and one H 2 operation, while the Decrypt algorithm will take 2n times of multiplication operations, 2n times of addition operations and 1 H 2 operation. Detailed computation costs of each algorithm is listed in Table 1 . From Table 1 , it can be seen that the total computation efficiency is much higher in our scheme compared to current ABE schemes since bilinear pairing operations have been totally eliminated.
Conclusion
In this paper, we combine the advantage of key-insulation mechanism with ABE and propose a high efficient key-insulated ABE algorithm without pairings (KI-ABE-WP). During the running of algorithms in our scheme, users and AA needn't run any bilinear pairing operations. The high efficiency and proved security make our scheme more appropriate for data sharing in network systems, especially those with limited computing capacity such as wireless sensor networks, mobile communication system, etc.
Our future research should focus on the ABS (attribute based signature) without pairing operations, which provides secure data authentication with higher efficiency than current ABS schemes. 
